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Today, a large body of research exists regarding the correct-
ness of routing protocols. However, many reported global
disruptions of Internet connectivity, e.g., inter-AS persistent
loops, cannot be explained by looking at a single routing
protocol at a time. In fact, these anomalies have long been
suspected in the operator community to be caused by the
interactions between routing protocols. The interactions be-
tween protocol instances are governed by two procedures at
the border routers: route selection (RS) ranks routes from
different protocol instances; and route redistribution (RR)
exchanges routes between protocol instances. Prior studies
hypothesized that RR may be responsible for a portion of
the observed anomalies. In this paper, we provide analytical
and experimental results to link RS, RR, and their interplay
to anomalies discovered in operational networks. We show
that RS by itself can cause route oscillations and loops, and
that in all Cisco, Quagga, and XORP implementations, non-
deterministic behaviors may occur because of their incor-
rect modeling of the dependencies between RS and RR. We
identify the root cause for each of the instabilities and de-
rive a configuration guideline as well as a functional model
to eliminate them.
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the primary goals of a network is to ensure the
proper delivery of packets to the intended destinations. Rout-
ing protocols play an essential role toward that objective.
They disseminate routing information and allow routers to
compute their forwarding tables. Because of their impor-
tance, a large body of research has been devoted to the cor-
rectness of routing protocols.
However, existing analytical frameworks as well as empir-
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ical studies for understanding routing dynamics concentrate
on one routing protocol at a time, most notably BGP [22],
[33], [19], [6], [18], [16]. The reality is that a large num-
ber of the reported disruptions of Internet connectivity, such
as the ones listed below, cannot be easily explained by the
misbehavior of a single routing protocol.
Persistent forwarding loops: Several studies [31], [34]
have reported the existence of persistent forwarding loops
within an AS or across multiple networks. The discoveries
of inter-AS routing loops were surprising given the fact that
BGP has been specifically designed to avert the formation of
such loops via checking the AS PATH attribute. Those stud-
ies [31], [34] conjectured that the interactions between static
routes and BGPmay have originated the inter-AS loops. Our
own discussions with operators reveal that the operational
community also views the interactions between BGP and
IGPs as a possible root cause of this problem: the injec-
tion of routes from BGP into IGP, and then re-injection of
the same routes from IGP back into BGP at another location
will reset the AS PATH attribute and render the BGP’s guard
against inter-AS loops ineffective.
IP prefix hijacks: Prefix hijacks, such as the notorious
AS 7007 incident [30], periodically happen in the Internet.
This type of anomaly can have a large impact, disrupting the
connectivity of thousands of networks. Misconfigurations
are frequently cited as the source of the problem. McPherson
[29] took a closer look at the root cause of a recent IP prefix
hijack and hypothesized that the interactions between BGP
and static routes may have been at the origin of the routing
anomaly. Our discussions with operators suggest that a se-
quence of route injections between BGP and IGPs, which
resets the AS PATH, may also cause a network to advertise a
prefix it does not own. Traffic for the affected prefix is subse-
quently black-holed when the offending network has insuf-
ficient resources to handle the increased amount of traffic.
Nondeterministic forwarding paths: Messages posted
on bulletin boards used by network operators indicate that
a network configuration consisting of multiple routing do-
mains may result in unexpected forwarding paths. Chen and
Yuan [7] described a case involving the interactions between
iBGP and static routes. Our experiments show that the scope
of the problem is significantly larger: e.g., interactions be-
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tween BGP and OSPF, or between OSPF and RIP, have the
same problem. None of the existing analytical frameworks
can explain the observed outcomes.
The operational community has long suspected that the
culprit of these anomalies may lie in the interactions be-
tween routing protocols. However, despite the severity of
the problems, there is a surprisingly small number of studies
on such interactions from the research community. Two of
them [20], [32] introduced several frameworks to analyze the
impact of the underlying IGP on BGP, and formulated con-
ditions that may lead to forwarding loops, route oscillations,
and delayed convergence. In our previous work [27], we de-
veloped a formal model to reason about the consequences of
injecting routes across routing domains. In particular, that
model can be used to explain the permanent inter-AS for-
warding loops and IP prefix hijacks mentioned above.
Yet, these studies cannot make sense of all the anomalies
described above. For example, none of them can provide
a good explanation of the reported nondeterministic routing
behaviors. In addition, the results in [20] and [32] are spe-
cific to the interactions between BGP and an IGP. However,
recent empirical studies [28], [25] show that operational net-
works frequently deploy multiple instances of IGP and join
them through route redistributions rather than with BGP to
achieve important design objectives such as efficient routing.
The interactions between these IGP instances require further
research.
The interactions between different instances of routing pro-
tocols configured on one network, which we will simply re-
fer to as routing instances, are currently governed by two
procedures executed at border routers: route selection and
route redistribution. The route selection procedure ranks
routes received from different routing protocol instances and
selects a “best” route among them for forwarding purposes,
and the route redistribution procedure facilitates the exchange
of routing information between routing instances. They are
critically important for two reasons. First, they allow opera-
tors to fulfill a necessary function, that of integrating multi-
ple routing domains. Second, operators make extensive use
of route selection and route redistribution as primitives to
achieve important design objectives that cannot be accom-
plished by routing protocols (including BGP) alone [25].
Prior studies [11], [12], [27] have provided some evidence
based on simple scenarios that route redistribution is a sepa-
rate risk factor from routing protocols for routing anomalies.
In this paper, we present analytical and experimental results
to link route selection and route redistribution to reported
routing instabilities in operational networks, including the
aforementioned forwarding loops and nondeterministic for-
warding paths. We consider this a primary contribution of
the paper. Additional contributions from this paper are as
follows:
1. We show that the problem is more fundamental than pre-
viously reported. We show that route selection by itself –
i.e., merely the presence of multiple routing instances in
one network, without any exchange of routes between the
routing instances – can also result in some of the reported
routing anomalies.
2. We show that the problem is broader than previously re-
ported. We present experimental results showing that all
tested Cisco, Quagga, and XORP products have incor-
rectly implemented the dependencies between route se-
lection and route redistribution which can cause nonde-
terministic routing outcomes.
3. We conduct a root cause analysis of the disclosed insta-
bilities. We identify necessary conditions for each cate-
gory of anomalies (loops, oscillations, nondeterministic
routing behaviors) that can derive from route selection
and its interplay with route redistribution. Our analy-
sis indicates that the nondeterministic routing outcomes
likely result from a lack of a detailed functional model of
the dependencies between route selection and route re-
distribution.
4. Finally, we propose a configuration guideline to miti-
gate some of the instabilities. We formally prove that the
guideline will prevent the targeted instabilities. We also
present a functional model to precisely define the depen-
dencies between route selection and route redistribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides more details on how the route selection and route
redistribution procedures work and describes two key prop-
erties of their functionality. Section 3 analyzes the routing
anomalies due to route selection. Section 4 addresses the
additional instabilities caused by the interplay between route
selection and route redistribution. Section 5 presents related
work and finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses future
work.
2. ABSTRACTING THE INTERACTIONS
A router can run multiple routing protocols (e.g., BGP,
EIGRP, IS-IS, OSPF, RIP) at the same time. Certain ven-
dors even allow a router to create multiple instances of the
same routing protocol (e.g., OSPF 1, OSPF 2). A software
process is associated with each of the created routing pro-
tocol instances and it is commonly referred to as a routing
process. Each routing process is generally assigned a Rout-
ing Information Base (RIB) [13]. This database is used to
store the routing information related to the routing process
(e.g., routes received from peers).
2.1 Route Selection
A router may run multiple routing processes and receive
more than one route (e.g., an OSPF route and a RIP route)
to the same destination prefix. Some examples and motiva-
tions for such scenarios are described in Section 3. When
receiving multiple routes to the same destination prefix from
different routing processes, the router uses an inter-protocol
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Figure 1: An enterprise with two office branches, each
deploying its own routing protocol. By default, the RIP
routers have no visibility of the destinations in the OSPF
domain, and vice-versa.
in its Forwarding Information Base (FIB). This route selec-
tion procedure is the focus of our study. To add flexibility
to the procedure, router vendors have introduced the con-
cept of administrative distance (AD) [14] to aid ranking of
routes from different routing protocols. Each routing pro-
cess has a default AD value (e.g., 110 for OSPF and 120 for
RIP on Cisco routers), which can be overridden per router
and per prefix with special router configuration commands.
All routes by default inherit the AD value of their respec-
tive routing process and the functionality of the route se-
lection procedure can be precisely defined by the following
property:
Route Selection Property (P1): When multiple routing
processes offer routes to the same destination prefix, the route
with the lowest AD value is selected for the FIB.
The routing process with the lowest AD value is referred
to as the selected routing process, and the route that is put in
the FIB (to forward traffic) the active route.
More specifically, each routing process first determines its
best path using a protocol specific algorithm. For example,
RIP prefers routes with the lowest metric value while BGP
compares multiple criteria including the LOCAL PREF, the
AS PATH length and other parameters. Then, each routing
process presents its most preferred route to the route selec-
tion procedure, which compares all the received routes and
chooses the one with the lowest AD value.
To illustrate the route selection procedure, consider the
network depicted in Figure 1. We focus on router A and we
assume that it is configured with a static route to a destina-
tion prefix P . Router A runs a routing process of RIP and a
routing process of OSPF, and we assume that both are con-
figured with a lower AD value than that of the static route.
When router A receives a route to destination P through a
RIP neighbor, A shall prefer the RIP route to the static route
and use it to forward the traffic.
2.2 Route Redistribution
Routing processes of different routing protocols by de-
fault are totally independent and do not exchange routing
information even when they are running on the same router
(e.g., OSPF process and RIP process on routerA of Figure 1.)
In fact, routing processes of the same routing protocol on the
same router by default do not exchange routing information
either (e.g., OSPF 1 and OSPF 2 on a same router). How-
ever, routing processes are required to exchange routing in-
formation with their peer processes, which are configured for
the same routing protocol instance but on different routers
(e.g., in Figure 1, RIP process on X and RIP process on A).
More precisely, two routing processes are said to belong to
the same routing instance when they run on different routers
and form an adjacency, i.e., run the same routing protocol
and exchange routing information.
When a network is composed of multiple routing instances,
routes may need to be exchanged across routing instances.
By default, routing information originated in a routing in-
stance (i.e., by a member routing process) remains within the
boundaries of that routing instance (i.e., shared only among
routing processes of that routing instance). For example, in
the network depicted in Figure 1, the RIP routers do not have
visibility of the destinations in the OSPF instance and vice-
versa. To allow communications across routing instances,
vendors have introduced a router function called route re-
distribution, which must be explicitly enabled. The function
can be enabled between any pair of routing processes (e.g.,
one RIP and the other OSPF) running on the same router to
move routes from one (called source) into the other (called
target). Although not formally specified by vendors, a key
property for route redistribution is:
Route Redistribution Property (P2): A route is advertised
and redistributed only if it is active [27].
A routing protocol should advertise a route only if the
route is active. Violations of this property can result in rout-
ing anomalies as illustrated in Section 3.2. We note that
by definition, link-state routing protocols relay all received
routing information independently of whether a route is ac-
tive. However, all vector protocols ought to satisfy property
P2.
Following the same reasoning, a route should only be re-
distributed from a source routing process into a target rout-
ing process when the route is active. For example, consider a
router running three routing processes u, v and w. Suppose
that redistributions from u to v and from v to w are con-
figured. In addition, assume that the active route has come
from u. In such a case, the route is redistributed into v but
not into w.
Finally, a recent study shows that operators use route se-
lection and route redistribution to not only interconnect rout-
ing instances, but also meet important operational needs that
cannot be provided by routing protocols alone [25].
3. INSTABILITIES OFROUTE SELECTION
This section presents routing anomalies that can derive
from route selection by itself, i.e., without any route redis-
tribution configured between the routing instances. Section
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Figure 2: Illustration of route oscillations. The same destination prefix P is originated in both instances. The dashed
arrows represent signaling messages. Routers shaded in dark represent routers with a route to the destination. The
state at t3 is identical to that at t6.
3.1 illustrates how route oscillations and forwarding loops
may occur. Section 3.2 analyzes the root cause for each of
these anomalies. Finally, Section 3.3 presents a configura-
tion guideline to eliminate these anomalies.
Topologies and routing designs similar to those described
in this section have been observed in operational networks
[28], [11], [25]. In addition, we have validated all the de-
scribed scenarios, with the exception of those requiring spe-
cific race conditions, as it is difficult to create them. The
validation environment consisted of Cisco 2600 routers (IOS
Version 12.2).
3.1 Illustration of Routing Anomalies
We use the following notation throughout the paper. Rout-
ing instances are numbered 1, 2, ..., routers labeled A, B, ...,
and routing processes denoted by<router>.<routing instance>.
For example, B.1 designates the routing process from rout-
ing instance 1 at router B.
3.1.1 Route Oscillations
We assume the network depicted in Figure 2(a). It is sim-
ilar to the network depicted in Figure 1 with the following
difference: we assume that each office branch deploys an in-
stance of a distance vector protocol, specifically EIGRP. Em-
pirical studies have shown that operational networks com-
monly deploy multiple instances of a same routing proto-
col [11], [25]. We further assume that routers A and B
are not configured to perform route redistribution, and have
the default AD values for the two EIGRP routing processes.
The discussion is in respect to a given destination prefix P
originated by both instances. Recent empirical studies have
also shown that in operational settings, one destination pre-
fix can be originated by multiple instances [25]. P may be
the default route, originated by each instance. Alternatively,
each office branch may receive routes to the same destina-
tion through their respective ISP.
The following sequence of events illustrates the possible
formation of a route oscillation.
t1 Routes are propagated in both instances of EIGRP.
t2 Upon receiving a route, routers D and Y learn a route to
P and then further advertise the route to their neighbors
(i.e., A and B respectively).
t3 RouterA receives a route from routing processA.2 point-
ing to D as the next-hop. Similarly, router B receives a
route from routing processB.1 pointing to Y as the next-
hop.
t4 RouterA further advertises the route into routing instance
2 through its neighbor router C. At the same time, router
B further advertises the route into routing instance 1 through
its neighbor router A.
t5 Router A receives 2 routes (from A.1 and A.2). Because
they have the same AD values, some implementations se-
lect the latest received information [15], i.e., the route
from A.1. Similarly, router B receives 2 routes (from
B.1 andB.2). Because they have the same AD values, B
may select the route from B.2.
t6 Since router A selected the route from A.1, A.2 stops ad-
vertising a route to P . In the same way, router B.1 stops
advertising a route to P . Consequently, routers A and B
lose their routes fromA.1 andB.2 respectively. A reverts
to using its previous route fromA.2 and in the same man-
ner, B uses the route from B.1 [13]. The resulting state
is identical to that at t4. In other words, we have a route
oscillation.
The duration of the oscillation varies depending upon how
long routing events at routers A and B are synchronized.
Thus, such routing anomalies may have been diagnosed as
transient forwarding loops. We note that the described sce-










Figure 3: Illustration of a permanent forwarding loop
(A-B-C-A). Routers A and B each receive two routes
with identical AD values. The route selection is nonde-
terministic and if A selects the route from OSPF 1 and
B, the route from OSPF 2, the loop results.
[25] have disclosed that operational networks frequently de-
ploy dozens or even hundreds of routing instances. In such
large settings, the interactions would become significantly
more complex and the chances for routing anomalies would
increase considerably. In addition, the problem can be ex-
acerbated by the proprietary nature of the AD concept: each
router vendor has its own set of default values for routing
protocols, and consequently, route selection configurations
can result in not only oscillations of arbitrary time length
but also permanent route oscillations [26].
While vendors have introduced proprietary solutions such
as RIB quarantining [8] to mitigate the impact of route os-
cillations, it is necessary to fix the problems at their roots in
order to restore connectivity. Prior studies of route oscilla-
tions have focused on BGP [6], [20], [19], [18]. We have just
shown that the simple co-existence of IGP instances, even
without BGP, can be another plausible cause.
3.1.2 Forwarding Loops
In addition to causing route oscillations, the route selec-
tions across multiple protocol instances can also result in
permanent forwarding loops. This is the case when some of
the protocol instances perform link-state routing. We assume
the network depicted in Figure 3. The topology is identical
to those previously considered. However, each of the of-
fice branches is now running OSPF. Empirical studies [25]
provide evidence that operational networks deploy multiple
instances of OSPF for administrative reasons: each office
branch may be administered by a separate team. Such de-
sign may also result from a company merger or may be in-
tentional in order to control the dissemination of the routes
[11]. We further assume that no route redistribution is con-
figured and all the routers use the default administrative dis-
tances for the routing processes.
As depicted in Figure 3, this configuration can result in
a permanent forwarding loop (A-B-C-A): when router A
receives two routes (from A.1 and A.2), because they have
identical AD values, A may select the route from A.1 [11].
Similary, B may select the route from B.2 resulting in a for-
warding loop A-B-C-A.
The depicted configuration nondeterministically results in




















Figure 4: Illustration of the dispute wheel responsible for
the oscillations observed in Figure 2.
der routers, which increases the difficulties of the debugging
task. This scenario shows that route selection by itself can
be at the origin of observed permanent forwarding loops. In
addition, B.1 (respectively A.2) may be configured with a
strictly larger AD value than that of B.2 (respectively A.1).
Such an AD assignment can happen in a multi-vendor en-
vironment, or result from a configuration error, and it will
consistently result in a forwarding loop.
3.2 Analysis of Root Cause
Route oscillations: The route oscillations described pre-
viously (e.g., in Figure 2) occur because routers repeatedly
advertise and withdraw a route. This happens in response
to a prefered route being offered and then retracted. Since
routers in a link-state protocol advertise all of their informa-
tion – independently of their selected paths to a destination
– the interactions of route selections between only link-state
routing processes do not cause route oscillations. Route os-
cillations can occur only if the route selections involve a
minimum of two routing protocol instances like BGP, RIP,
and EIGRP, which only advertise routes that are active.
The root cause of the oscillations is in fact similar to those
in the BGP context. Griffin et al. [18] demonstrated that the
presence of dispute wheels can be responsible for route oscil-
lations. Before presenting the formal definition of a dispute
wheel, we first introduce some notations. [18] suggested
the following definitions: Considering a simple, undirected
graph, G = (V,E), where V is the set of nodes and E the
set of edges, we focus on a specific node, called the ori-
gin. Every other node attempts to establish a path to the
origin. A path in G is either empty or a sequence of nodes
(ukuk−1...u0) such that for all i ∈ [0, k−1], {ui+1, ui}∈ E.
Then, for every u ∈ V , Pu represents the set of permitted
paths from u to the origin. Finally, for each u ∈ V , there is
a ranking function λu, defined over Pu: if P1, P2 ∈ Pu and
λu(P1) < λu(P2), then u prefers the path P2 over P1.
A dispute wheel Π = ("U, "Q, "R) of size k is defined as a
sequence of nodes "U = u0, u1, ..., uk−1, and sequences of
non-empty paths "Q = Q0, Q1, ..., Qk−1, "R = R0, R1, ..., Rk−1
such that for every i ∈ [0, k − 1], (1) Ri is a path from ui
to ui+1; (2) Qi ∈ Pui ; (3) RiQi+1 ∈ Pui ; (4) λui(Qi) ≤
λui(RiQi+1). (All subscripts are modulo k.)
Figure 4 highlights the dispute wheel responsible for the
route oscillations described in Section 3.1.1 and Figure 2.
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Forwarding loops: The permanent forwarding loops oc-
cur because of deflections. Deflections are formally defined
[20] as follows: Considering a destination router u0, and as-
suming that un has selected the forwarding path P (un) =
unun−1 . . . u0, P (un)[ui, uj ] denotes the subpath of P (un)
starting at ui and ending at uj with i ≥ j. A deflection hap-
pens on P (un) at ui if P (ui) %= P (un)[ui, u0] but for all
j > i, P (uj) = P (un)[uj , u0].
It was shown that the occurrence of deflections between
iBGP and its underlying IGP can result in forwarding loops
[20]. We have just shown that deflections can result from
the interaction between any two routing instances, causing
permanent loops. In Figure 3, deflections at routers A andB
are responsible for the observed loop. In fact, the forward-
ing loops occur because of the AD assignment at the differ-
ent routers: the configuration includes a dispute wheel. Yet,
as link-state protocols advertise all routes they receive, re-
gardless if they are active, dispute wheels do not cause route
oscillations but deflections.
3.3 Guideline for Safe Route Selection
Because the focus of this paper is on the interactions be-
tween routing protocols, we assume that packet forwarding
within each routing instance is free of instabilities; more
formally, the routing protocol converges and the forward-
ing paths for each destination form a directed acyclic graph
where all routers of the routing instance are connected, and
all the leaf node(s), i.e., node(s) with no outgoing edges,
either are directly connected to the destination network or
run multiple routing processes (i.e., serve as a border router
joining multiple routing instances). Given a network, we
consider all static routes across the routers to form a single
routing instance and assume that this instance is also free of
instabilities. Finally, we assume that routing instances are
not deployed in an overlay fashion. A routing protocol in-
stance k is deployed in overlay between two routers A, B
when A.k learns a route pointing to B as the next-hop but
B is not directly connected to A, and A needs to rely on a
routing instance instance different than k to reach B. While
overlay networks (e.g., an iBGP mesh) can result in routing
anomalies [20], [9], they are beyond the scope of this paper.
Griffin et al. [18] showed that the absence of dispute
wheels guarantees the convergence of the route exchanges.
This condition is a major result and has steered much of the
recent research in BGP stability. However, although im-
portant, this result may not be practical especially for op-
erators who need to configure a network with multiple IGP
instances. The relationships between BGP networks (cus-
tomer, provider, peer) form a hierarchy between them and
guarantee the absence of dispute wheels [17]. However,
routing protocol instances within a network do not present
similar relationships nor patterns [25]. There is currently no
guideline on how to assign the AD values to guarantee the
safety of route selections. As such, we propose the following
guideline.
Guideline 1: For a destination prefix P , all processes of
a routing instance shall share the same AD value and ev-
ery routing instance shall be assigned a globally unique AD
value.
Theorem 1: Guideline 1 guarantees the absence of dis-
pute wheels spanning multiple routing instances and thus the
convergence of the route selections.
Proof: We prove it by contradiction. Assume that a net-
work compliant with Guideline 1 still contains a dispute wheel
Π = ("U, "Q, "R) of size k and spanning at least two distinct
routing instances.
Step 1 By definition of the dispute wheel, each router ui
receives at least two paths (Qi, and RiQi+1) to the origin.
Each of these paths may have been received through multi-
ple routing processes. Considering all routing processes at
ui that offer the path RiQi+1 (respectively, Qi), let ui.ρi
(respectively, ui.ρ′i) represent the routing process with the
lowest AD value. By definition of the dispute wheel, Qi is
less preferred than RiQi+1 at ui. Let AD(ui.ρi) be the AD
value of the routing process ui.ρi. We derive that for all
i ∈ [0; k − 1]
AD(ui.ρ′i) ≥ AD(ui.ρi) (1)
Step 2 Because there is no configured route redistribution,
and no routing instance is deployed in overlay, for two suc-
cessive routers x and y on a forwarding path to the origin,
the set of routing instances through which x learns the route
is always a subset of those for y. As such, the fact that ui
learns RiQi+1 from ρi implies that the router ui+1 (on the
path RiQi+1) is also running a routing process in ρi, and
ui+1 learned the subpathQi+1 from at least ρi. By definition
of the dispute wheel, Qi+1 is less preferred than Ri+1Qi+2
at ui+1. Therefore, we derive that for all i ∈ [0; k − 1]
AD(ui+1.ρi) ≥ AD(ui+1.ρi+1) (2)
Step 3 Since the network complies with Guideline 1, all
routing processes within the same routing instance have the
same AD value. Therefore, for every i ∈ [0; k − 1] (modulo
k)
AD(ui.ρi) = AD(ui+1.ρi) (3)
From equations (2) and (3), we derive
AD(u1.ρ0) ≥ AD(u1.ρ1) =
AD(u2.ρ1) ≥ AD(u2.ρ2) =
. . . ≥ . . . =
AD(u0.ρk−1) ≥ AD(u0.ρ0) = AD(u1.ρ0)
Since the network complies with Guideline 1, every routing
instance is assigned a globally unique AD value. As such,
from the previous equations, we derive
ρ0 = ρ1 = . . . = ρk−1 (4)
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Step 4 From Steps 1 and 2, for all i, ui learns the path Qi
from two routing instances: ρi′ and ρi−1. By definition of
ρi′ , we derive that
AD(ui.ρ′i) ≤ AD(ui.ρi−1)
Then, from equation (4), since ρi−1 = ρi, we obtain
AD(ui.ρ′i) ≤ AD(ui.ρi)
Finally, combining with equation (1), we conclude that
AD(ui.ρi) ≤ AD(ui.ρ′i) ≤ AD(ui.ρi)
which means that for all i ∈ [0; k − 1], ρi = ρ′i. Therefore,
ρ0 = ρ1 = . . . = ρk−1 = ρ′0 = ρ′1 = . . . = ρ′k−1. This con-
tradicts the initial assumption that the dispute wheel spans
multiple distinct routing instances. !
In addition to guaranteeing convergence, Guideline 1 also
guarantees loop-free forwarding paths.
Theorem 2: Guideline 1 guarantees that the forwarding
paths between the routing instances are devoid of permanent
forwarding loops.
Proof: Again by contradiction. Suppose a network
compliant with Guideline 1 contains a permanent loop
u0u1 . . . uk−1u0 for a destination prefix P . Let ρi denote
the routing instance from which ui learns its active route to
P . Packet forwarding within each routing instance is free of
instabilities. As such, there exists i ∈ [0; k − 1] such that ui
and ui+1 learn their active route to P from two distinct rout-
ing instances. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
u0 and u1 learn their active route from two different routing
instances ρ0 and ρ1. Note that the discussion below is with
respect to destination P .
Step 1 This section assumes no configured route redistri-
bution. Therefore, u0 learns its active route from another
member of routing instance ρ0. This section also assumes
that routing instances are not deployed in an overlay fash-
ion. As such, the router to which u0 forwards its traffic (i.e.,
u1) is the router that advertised the route to u0 through rout-
ing instance ρ0. We conclude that u1 is also a member of ρ0.
However, the active route at u1 is learned from a different
routing instance ρ1. Consequently,
AD(u1, ρ0) ≥ AD(u1, ρ1) (5)
Step 2 For every i ∈ [1; k−1], the router ui points to ui+1 as
its next-hop. As above, ui+1 is a member of ρi. Now, ui+1’s
active route can be learned from the same routing instance
(i.e., ρi+1 = ρi) or from a different routing instance (ρi+1 %=
ρi). We will show that in both cases, we have
AD(ui+1, ρi) ≥ AD(ui+1, ρi+1) (6)
Case 1: ρi = ρi+1. Since the network complies to Guideline
1, all routing processes of a routing instance have the
same AD value. We conclude that
AD(ui+1, ρi) = AD(ui+1, ρi+1)
Case 2: ρi %= ρi+1. Since ui+1 learns its active route from
ρi+1, we derive
AD(ui+1, ρi) ≥ AD(ui+1, ρi+1)
Step 3 Because the network complies with Guideline 1, all
routing processes within the same routing instance have the
same AD value. In other words, for every i ∈ [1; k] (modulo
k)
AD(ui+1, ρi+1) = AD(ui+2, ρi+1) (7)
From equations (5), (6) and (7),
AD(u1, ρ0) ≥ AD(u1, ρ1) =
AD(u2, ρ1) ≥ AD(u2, ρ2) =
. . . ≥ . . . =
AD(u0, ρk−1) ≥ AD(u0, ρ0) = AD(u1, ρ0)
In particular, AD(u1, ρ0) = AD(u1, ρ1). As ρ0 and ρ1 are
distinct, this equation contradicts Guideline 1 which states
that every routing instance is assigned a globally unique AD
value. !
Surprisingly, the proposed guideline has not been reported
by the operational community despite its conceptual simplic-
ity. It shows the value of the type of analysis carried out in
this paper. It is unclear this guideline can accomodate all
existing operational requirements. We leave this question to
future work. Finally, in prior work [24], we derived similar
guidelines for route redistribution.
4. INTERPLAY BETWEEN ROUTE
SELECTION AND REDISTRIBUTION
The previous section disclosed routing anomalies caused
by route selection alone, and identified a configuration guide-
line for safe route selection. This section analyzes new in-
stabilities that can occur when route redistribution is used
in conjunction with route selection. The focus is to explain
why the interplay between route selection and route redistri-
bution can easily cause the nondeterministic forwarding path
problem described in Section 1.
Section 4.1 illustrates the anomaly, its severe consequences,
and examines the extensiveness of the problem. We present
experimental results which show that the problem is not just
specific to one software implementation nor specific to one
combination of routing protocols.
Section 4.2 hypothesizes possible causes for the observed
anomaly based on additional experimental results. We pos-
tulate that the root of the problem is the lack of a precise
specification of route selection and route redistribution, and
more importantly, how the two procedures should interact.
Finally, Section 4.3 investigates how to eliminate the non-













Figure 5: Nondeterministic forwarding paths.
for guiding the implementation of route selection and route
redistribution procedures. We formally establish the correct-
ness and utility of the model by showing that an implemen-
tation compliant to this model will guarantee both of the es-
sential properties defined in Section 2 at all times.
4.1 Nondeterministic Routing Behaviors
4.1.1 Motivating Scenario
The following scenario is first described in [7]. Consider
the network depicted in Figure 5. It consists of a provider
network offering Internet service to a customer network
through two IP links: A-X and B-X . The routers A, B, and
C in the provider network run an IGP and in addition, form a
full iBGPmesh. At routersA andB, static routes pointing to
prefixes inside the customer’s network are redistributed into
BGP so that they can be further propagated to other BGP net-
works. Suppose that the customer has designated the A-X
link as the primary entryway for traffic arriving from the ser-
vice provider, and B-X as a backup link. As such, the BGP
process at routerB is configured with a lower AD value (i.e.,
higher preference) than static routes. The expected behavior
is that whenever the A-X link is up and A is reachable from
B, B will forward all traffic to the customer network via A
using the route offered from the BGP process.
However, it was reported that the forwarding paths at B
surprisingly depend on the timing of when the static routes
are entered at routers A and B [7]. Such a nondeterministic
behavior is clearly an anomaly with severe consequences.
Contrary to the design goal, B may forward traffic to the
customer directly to X and announce this backup route to
other BGP neighbors even though the primary link A-X is
up and accessible.
To verify the report of [7] , we have implemented the
topology of Figure 5 using 4 Cisco 3600 routers with IOS
Version 12.2. We have observed the following behaviors at
routerB regarding a particular prefix in the customer network:
Case 1: When an iBGP route, redistributed from a static
route that has been entered at routerA, is the only route
presented to the route selection procedure, it becomes
the active route. Then, when a static route for the same

















Figure 6: Experiment setup. A router is configured with
two routing processes (u, v) and receives two routes to the
same prefix. Mutual route redistribution is configured
between u and v.
the active route because of its lower AD value. This is
the expected and correct behavior.
Case 2: When the local static route is installed before the
iBGP route from router A arrives, the static route be-
comes the active route and is locally redistributed into
BGP. Then, when the iBGP route from A arrives, even
though the newly received iBGP route has a lower AD
value than the local static route, the static route re-
mains the active route. This is an incorrect behavior
because it violates property P1 as stipulated in Section
2.1. The route with a lower AD value did not become
the active route.
4.1.2 Extensiveness of Problem
We have conducted more experiments to examine the ex-
tent of the nondeterministic behavior described above. We
seek to determine whether the anomaly is specific to one
software implementation (i.e., IOS 12.2) or one routing pro-
tocol (i.e., iBGP).
The experiments have a simple setup as depicted in Figure 6,
where a single border router connects two routing instances.
We have experimented with four different implementations
for the border router: Cisco 3600 IOS version 12.2(24a),
Quagga Software Routing Suite [4] version 0.98.6 (which
is the latest stable release), Quagga Software Routing Suite
version 0.99.10 (latest unstable release), and and XORP [5]
version 1.4 (latest release at the time of the experiments).
For each implementation, two routing processes u and
v are configured on the border router. One of the routing
processes is configured with a lower AD value to provide
the primary routes for all destinations. The other routing
process should only provide backup routes. We have ex-
perimented with different protocol combinations for these
processes. All the combinations are given in the first two
columns of Table 1. Mutual route redistributions are config-
ured between u and v.
In each experiment, we advertise two routes to a same
destination prefix P to the border router. Static routes are
directly entered to the router and the other routes are adver-
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Source of Routes Implementation
Primary Backup Cisco Quagga Quagga XORP(IOS 12.2) (0.98.6) (0.99.10) (1.4)
BGP static ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕
static BGP ! ! ! !
OSPF static ! ! ! !
static OSPF ! ! ! !
RIP OSPF ! ✕ ! ✕
OSPF RIP ! ! ! !
RIP static ! ✕ ! ✕
static RIP ! ! ! !
RIP BGP ! ✕ ! ✕
BGP RIP ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕
OSPF BGP ! ! ! !
BGP OSPF ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕
Table 1: Summary of experimental results. “!” indi-
cates a behavior conforming to property P1 (Section 2.1)
and independent of the arrival order of the advertise-
ments. “✕” signifies that the arrival order of the adver-
tisements impacts the outcome of route selection.
tised from a neighboring router running a routing process
that peers with either u or v. We vary the timing of the two
route advertisements and then inspect the forwarding table
of the border router to determine the outcome of the route
selection and route redistribution procedures.
The results of the experiments are summarized in Table 1.
The symbol “!” indicates a behavior conforming to prop-
erty P1 as stipulated in Section 2.1: the route with the lowest
AD value is always selected as the active route, independent
of the arrival order of the advertisements. The symbol “✕”
signifies that the arrival order of the advertisements impacts
the outcome of route selection and there are cases where the
route with a higher AD becomes the active route.
We make the following two observations. First, all tested
implementations produced unexpected outcomes some of the
time. The problem therefore appears to be pervasive. Sec-
ond, the outcome varied from implementation to implemen-
tation for some protocol combinations. This suggests that
part of the problem may be due to software coding errors.
For example, we discovered such an error in the Quagga
version 0.98.6 source code: When a route is locally redis-
tributed into the RIP protocol, all RIP messages received
from the neighbors are in fact discarded independently of
the AD values. This provides a good explanation of the ob-
served outcomes with RIP when using the Quagga 0.98.6
implementation. However, given the pervasiveness of the
problem, it seems more logical to conclude that the problem
is not entirely due to implementation errors but comes from a
lack of a precise model to understand, reason and support the
interactions between route selection and route redistribution.
4.2 Analysis of Root Cause
It is difficult to pinpoint the root cause or causes of the ob-
served anomalies because of the inaccessibility to the source
code of the commercial implementations and the scarce doc-


















Figure 7: An incorrect model of the dependencies be-
tween RS and RR. A particular sequence of events would
cause routes with higher AD values to be selected.
root cause for the Cisco implementation indirectly from in-
formation available to us from the experiment described in
Section 4.1.1.
As suggested by [7], a look at the protocol specific routing
information bases (RIBs) of router B shows that the redis-
tributed local static route is present in the RIB of the BGP
routing process. This discovery suggests that the Cisco im-
plementation may have followed an incorrect model of the
dependencies between route selection and route redistribu-
tion which is depicted in Figure 7. This model would cause
a violation of route selection property (P1) for the scenario
of Figure 5 under this sequence of events:
t1 When the local static route is installed before the iBGP
route from routerA is received, the static route is selected
to be the active route and redistributed into BGP.
t2 When the iBGP route from A arrives at B, it is put into
the same RIB as the redistributed local static route. This
is confirmed by an inspection of the BGP RIB.
t3 The BGP best path selection algorithm selects the best
route among all the ones present in the BGP’s RIB. By
default, locally redistributed routes are assigned aWEIGHT
value larger than that of routes received from BGP peers.
WEIGHT is a Cisco-specific attribute [10] and for Cisco
routers it is the first factor considered by the BGP best
path selection algorithm. A route with a higher WEIGHT
value is more preferred. Therefore in this case, the BGP
best path selection algorithm selects the locally redis-
tributed route as its best path. Then, for stability reasons,
the BGP process will filter out the route since it was re-
distributed from another process to prevent it from being
considered by the route selection procedure [27]. Finally,
the process converges and the iBGP route fromA, despite
having a lower AD value than the local static route, does
not become the active route at router B.
To confirm this conjecture, we reversed the WEIGHT val-
ues: locally redistributed routes are now assigned a lower
WEIGHT value than the iBGP routes. We repeated the ex-
periment, and this time the BGP selected the iBGP route
as expected and the anomaly went away. However, this fix
only applies to scenarios involving Cisco implementations
of BGP. For example, it will not eliminate nondeterministic
9



















Figure 8: Existing implementations may cause a viola-
tion of Property P2 as stipulated in Section 2.2. Here,
router C advertises a route that is not the active route
for the prefix.
routing behaviors incurred by the interactions between RIP
and OSPF.
The model depicted in Figure 7 can also fully explain the
observed behavior when the iBGP route is received before
the local static route is installed, i.e., Case 1 of Section 4.1.1.
The iBGP route becomes the active route upon arrival. Later,
when the static route is installed, both routes are considered
by the route selection procedure. The iBGP route remains
the active route because it presents a lower AD value. The
static route is not redistributed to BGP because it is not the
active route and the process converges as expected.
To summarize, we postulate that the nondeterministic rout-
ing behaviors are prevalent because of an incorrect func-
tional model where locally redistributed routes are recon-
sidered as inputs to the routing protocol specific path selec-
tion algorithms (e.g., BGP best path selection algorithm).
The negative impact of this kind of error is much bigger
than a typical software bug. Next, we substantiate this point
by showing that an implementation based on the incorrect
model can cause additional unexpected outcomes by violat-
ing the Route Redistribution Property (P2).
Additional anomaly: Consider the network shown in
Figure 8.
t1 Router C receives two routes to the same prefix P from a
BGP neighbor (A) and a RIP peer (B). Suppose that the
route from RIP becomes the active route because the RIP
process has been configured with a lower AD value.
t2 We assume that redistribution from RIP into BGP is con-
figured at C. As such, the active route from RIP is re-
distributed into BGP. The BGP RIB contains two routes
to P : the locally redistributed route, and the BGP route
from A. Suppose because of local policies (e.g., route-
map setting a larger WEIGHT value to routes received
from BGP neighbors) the BGP best path selection algo-
rithm prefers the route from the BGP neighbor to the lo-
cally redistributed route.
t3 As such, routerC advertises the BGP route received from
its BGP neighbor (A) to other BGP neighbors (e.g., D)
instead of the active route, i.e., the locally redistributed
route. This violates Property P2 and may cause deflec-
tions and permanent forwarding loops as illustrated in
Section 3.2.
4.3 A New Functional Model Making Depen-
dencies Unambiguous
This section presents a solution framework to eliminate
the nondeterministic behaviors. The key element is a func-
tional model of route selection and route redistribution that
makes the dependencies between the two procedures unam-
biguous and guarantees both the route selection and route
redistribution properties as defined in Section 2.
Section 4.3.1 describes a potential solution for vector pro-
tocols. Then, Section 4.3.2 extends the proposed solution
to accommodate link-state protocols. The need for exten-
sion comes from the differences in these two types of routing
protocols. While vector protocols first process the received
information and only advertise the best paths, link-state rout-
ing protocols relay all the received information, even before
computing the best paths. These characteristics require dif-
ferent designs. Finally, Section 4.3.3 shows that the pro-
posed functional model guarantees the two properties given
in Section 2.
4.3.1 A Functional Model for Vector Protocols
The proposed solution for vector protocols is depicted in
Figure 9 (upper part). Each vector routing process (e.g., RIP,
EIGRP) is assigned two RIBs: RIBin for incoming route an-
nouncements and RIBout for outgoing advertisements. A
new announcement from a peer must first pass through some
filters. The filters discard invalid advertisements and routes
not compliant with local policies. For example, RIP routes
whose metric exceeds 16 are filtered. After passing the fil-
ters, all routes are stored in the RIBin. A protocol specific
route determination algorithm subsequently chooses the most
preferred route among all routes to the same prefix.
Then, each routing process presents its best route to the
route selection procedure. The active route is selected based
on the AD values and installed in the router’s FIB.
The router’s FIB maintains the routes that are used to for-
ward traffic. In this model, an active route is by default re-
distributed into the RIBout of the selected process. For ex-
ample, if the active route comes from routing process A.k,
then the active route is by default installed into the RIBout of
routing process A.k and advertised to the peer processes of
A.k in routing instance k. The active route may also be redis-
tributed into other routing processes according to the route
redistribution configuration on the router. Routing policies
can be applied every time an active route is redistributed.
In this model, a locally redistributed route is not consid-
ered by any of the protocol specific route determination al-
gorithms. As such, the status of this route is unambiguous
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Figure 9: A functional model of RS and RR supporting all protocols.
4.3.2 Extension for Link State Protocols
This section extends the vector model to accommodate
link-state protocols. As depicted in Figure 9 (lower part),
each link-state routing process is also associated with two
databases: a RIB and an Eligible Information Base (EIB).
The RIB stores the regular link-state updates, including lo-
cally redistributed routes. All members of one link-state
routing instance will eventually have identical information
in their RIBs. Content-wise, EIB is a subset of RIB. It is
a separate entity, used to isolate the routes that are eligi-
ble to become active at the router. An additional built-in
filter between RIB and EIB prevents locally redistributed
routes from entering the EIB. Then, the protocol specific
route determination algorithm is executed based on the EIB
and the best route is presented to the route selection proce-
dure. Again, there is no ambiguity from the perspective of
the route selection procedure.
The route redistribution part accordingly requires a simple
extension. When the target routing process is a link-state
protocol, the redistributed route is inserted into the RIB of
the target routing process.
4.3.3 Correctness of the Proposed Model
The following theorem establishes the correctness of our
model.
Theorem 3: The proposed model guarantees route selec-
tion property P1 and route redistribution property P2 that
are presented in Section 2.
Proof: Consider a router and a destination prefix P . We
first prove by induction that independent of the message ar-
rival order, property P1 is guaranteed, i.e., the route with the
lowest AD value is selected as the active route.
1. P1 is trivially satisfied when no route to P is offered.
2. We assume that at time t1, the RS and RR procedures have
converged and P1 holds true. Now, suppose the first routing
event after t1 occurs at time t2: a route is withdrawn or a new
route (either static or coming from a peer) is added. In the
case of a route withdrawal, the RIBin(s) and the EIB(s) of the
remaining routing processes that still have a route are not im-
pacted by the route withdrawal. Each routing process selects
its most preferred route and presents it to the route selection
algorithm. The latter chooses the route with the lowest AD
value. The active route may be redistributed into different
routing processes, but this does not affect the RIBin(s) and
the EIB(s). As such, the process converges and P1 remains
true. In the case of a new route, contrary to existing imple-
mentations, locally redistributed routes are excluded from
consideration by any of the protocol specific route determi-
nation algorithms. This eliminates the error condition de-
scribed in Section 4.2. Consequently, each routing process
that possesses a non empty set of routes to P presents its
most preferred one to the route selection procedure, and the
route with the lowest AD value is then selected to become
the active route. Again, the active route may be redistributed
into different routing processes, but this does not modify the
content of the RIBin(s) and the EIB(s). As such, the process
converges and P1 remains true.
We have shown that the model guarantees P1. Further-
more, in the proposed model, a vector routing process ad-
vertises routes, to its peers, from the RIBout. As such, a
vector routing process advertises a route only if active. In
addition, routes are redistributed directly from the router’s
FIB. Therefore, a route can be redistributed only if active.
The model guarantees P2. !
5. RELATEDWORK
Router vendors [13] mention that route selection can cause
forwarding loops but do not provide any illustration nor guide-
line to avoid them. Some documents [12], [11], and [24] ex-
posed instabilities due to route redistribution. In earlier work
[27], we developed a framework to reason about the impacts
of route redistribution at a network-wide level. Yet, this pa-
per shows that route selection by itself, and its interplay with
route redistribution, can also be the source of routing anoma-
lies. Our work is the first to illustrate how routing instabil-
ities may result from route selection alone and its interplay
with route redistribution. We also analyze the root causes of
these instabilities and develop guidelines and solutions for
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preventing them.
Several studies [32], [20] looked at the interactions be-
tween BGP and its underlying IGP and revealed potential
instabilities. In comparison to these studies, the scope of our
work is much broader. Although our study does not encom-
pass overlay routing protocols, we show that the interactions
between any two routing processes, regardless which proto-
cols they run, can create routing anomalies and the instabil-
ities are not limited to route oscillations and loops.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We have demonstrated that the interactions between rout-
ing protocols are a much more complex problem than pre-
viously believed. While it has been recognized that route
redistribution (RR) can easily cause routing anomalies and
should be handled with care, this paper shows that route se-
lection (RS) in itself, and its interplay with RR, can also re-
sult in a wide range of routing anomalies. It establishes a
strong link between RS and RR and some of the puzzling
routing anomalies discovered in operational networks.
The overall results suggest a twofold conclusion. On the
one hand, the news is somewhat bleak. The RS and RR pro-
cedures are highly susceptible to routing anomalies and the
range of anomalies is much wider than previously reported.
Our study revealed that all tested implementations have in-
correctly represented the dependencies between RS and RR.
The lack of a well defined standard for these procedures
has certainly compounded the problem. On the other hand,
this paper shows that it might be possible to mitigate the
instabilities through a deeper understanding of the problem.
Many well-formulated theoretical frameworks have been de-
veloped for existing protocols, particularly for BGP. Because
of its severity and prevalence, this problem deserves similar
attention from the networking community.
In the big picture, we also see the need for ongoing ef-
forts aimed at redesigning the Internet routing architecture
[1], [23], [3] to closely examine the role of the interactions
between routing instances. The correctness of individual
routing protocols may still not be sufficient to guarantee cor-
rect routing in those settings. The current RS and RR pro-
cedures were invented without much consideration given to
their safety properties. A clean slate redesign of these pro-
cedures, with an emphasis on robustness, should be highly
desirable. [21] takes a first step in this direction. It intro-
duces an elegant framework allowing operators to define and
reason about routing protocols and their interactions. In the
future, we hope to build upon such frameworks to design the
next generation of “glue logic” [25] for routing protocols.
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